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CHAPTER

I

GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND INTENT
Transcendental philosophies, that is philosophies
which posit an a priori structuring of consciousness such
that there are patterned, dispositions of cognition, arise
out of the difficulties involved with various analyses of
the world.

An analysis of a particular problem may yield

certain results while another analysis will yield different,
perhaps conflicting, results; yet both analyses will be
self-justifying, coincide with the facts, or appear to have
inner consistency.

This conflict calls into question the

ultimate validity of both analyses and militates against the
possibility of even approaching an adequate or valid under
standing of the world.

Transcendental philosophy seeks to

analyze the problems at a deeper level which will overcome
these difficulties.

It attempts to do this, in part, by

analyzing the analysis.

This is done by inquiry into the

presuppositions of the analyses and specifying the horizons
of their operations.

Or in terms of cognition in general, it

attempts to delimit horizons of cognition by an inquiry into
its structuring agents.

But transcendental philosophy always

fails, itself in that an inquiry into the structuring agents
is always and ineluctably through those same agents which
1
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finally elude analysis.

Further, while transcendental

philosophy uncovers and delimits possibilities, it is in
capable of ascertaining the importance of any one of the
possibilities.

Nothing announces itself as meaningful in the

equally arbitrary possibilities.
As a philosophical position, transcendental philosophy
may be ultimately untenable, b u t , as a mode of analysis, it
has been used fruitfully to clarify naive argument and to
guide discussion into productive areas.

Heidegger’s Being

and T i m e , for example, which deals with the structure arid
status of man's existence and with the question of Being,
grew in part out of the background of Husserl's transcendental
phenomenology.
horizons.

The analysis is in terms of man's existential

Heidegger's use of transcendental phenomenology in

Being and Time is highly sophisticated and reflects this
extensive background.

This sophistication allows an articu

late expression of his ideas.

The "philosophy-psychology" of

C. G. Jung, on the other hand, emerges from a background of
biology and Freudian psychology, and grows into a sort of
transcendental philosophy out of his experiences with
patients and his studies of cultures and mythologies.

His

findings of universal areas of meaning and their imagery as
revealed in dreams, mythology, and in ongoing experiencing
led him to posit the archetypes as transcendental factors.
Jung's chief goal was not a philosophical system, but rather
a methodology for helping patients.

He considered his

methodology important for the ’’normal" as well as the sick."
Because of his concern with therapeutic methodology, his
"philosophy" consequently suffers.

It is unsophisticated

and troubled by a lack of an adequate terminology which
would properly express his ideas.

It is, on the other hand,

innovative and speaks to central issues which are neglected
by more sophisticated philosophies.

In this sense, the

"philosophy" of C. G. Jung is important to the philosophic
tradition.
It is the intent of this paper to attend to selected
areas of Ju n g ’s "philosophy" which are of ontological import
and to precision them in terms of Heidegger’s transcendental
ontology as set forth in Being and Time.

The precisioning

will be toward establishing the ontological status of arche
typal regions which will in turn speak to areas of diffi
culty or impasse in traditional transcendental approaches.
The paper is not intended to be a critique of Being and Time
or of Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole; rather Being and
Time is used as a point of departure and reference to pre
cision an important ontological area.

CHAPTER II
THE ARCHETYPAL IMAGE
Jung calls transcendental factors archetypes.

The

archetypes, according to Jung, are motifs which arrange the
functioning of the psyche into patterns but are not directly
observable.

They are a priori off inborn forms of percep

tion and apprehension which are necessary olP a priori determinants of all psychic processes.

1

Whenever one observes

uniform and regularly recurring modes of apprehension, he is
dealing with an archetype.

2

are such universal modes.

Anxiety and the desire to belong
The existentials explicated in

Being and Time are in this sense archetypes.

Jung states:

Just as we have been compelled to postulate the concept
of an instinct deteraining or regulating our conscious
actions, so, in order to account for the uniformity and
regularity of our perceptions, we must have recourse to
the correlated concept of a factor determining the mode
of apprehension.
It is the factor which I call the
archetype or primordial image.
The primordial image
might suitably be described as the instinct1s percep
tion of itself t or as the self-portrait of the instinct,
m exactly t!he same way as consciousness is an inward
perception of the objective life-process.3
C.
G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche;
in The Collected Works of C. G. J u n g , ed. by Sir Herbert
Read, trans. by R. i’« C. H u l l , Vjljli , 133•
2Ibid. t pp. 137-138.
3Ibid., pp. 136-137.
4
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Jung’s distinction between instinct and archetype is
unclear.

At times the definition of archetype seems to

include instinct within it; at other times a separation is
emphasized in which instincts institute fairly specific
actions and archetypes institute an apprehension of those
acts and of the relationship with the world in general.

In

both cases, however, archetypes function to establish an
understanding of the world; that is, their functioning is
toward meaning*
Archetypes as transcendental motifs reflect what is
constant and meaningful in the world.

One is always faced

with his own death, for example, recognition of which
affects man's relationship with himself and the world.

The

totality of archetypes Jung calls the collective unconscious.

4

The collective unconscious is not to be confused

with the personal unconscious., The latter consists of con
tents acquired from personal experience but.later falling
below the threshold of consciousness.

The former is uncon

scious in the sense that its contents were never conscious
but are universally present as structural motifs for and
prior to all cognition.
Although the concept of the unconscious is not gener
ally part of the working terminology of transcendental
4

C. G. Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Uncon-
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philosophy, the theme is ubiquitous and the term itself is
'not entirely foreign.

Husserl states, for example,

While the corresponding intentionality is being
executed, while it is flowing in this manner as an
Objectivatingly productive living, it is "uncon
scious"— that is to say: it makes thematic, but it
itself is, for that very reason and as a matter of
essential necessity, non-thematic.5
The archetypes are thematizing forces, but, insofar as an
inquiry into them is done in their theme, their thematizing
is never fully disclosed.

The archetypes as such remain

unconscious in the sense that they are never fully called
into consciousness.
As fundamental structuring forces, archetypes comprise
the totality of possibilities for human experiencing and
relatedness to the world.

The totality of archetypes and the

totality of what is possible for mam are coextensive by defi
nition.

The collective unconscious itself is the horizon of

all horizons.
Jung distinguishes between archetype and archetypal
image.

The former is not directly observable and can only

be recognized in archetypal images which are the manifest
product of the archetypes.

These archetypal images may vary

in the individuals and cultures in which they are manifest,
but there are universal aspects of these archetypal images
which are grounded in the archetypes as such.

Ancient Greece,

5
Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic,
trans. by Dorion Cairns, p. 34.
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for example, had seafaring capabilities to relatively distant
lands while in Mesopotamia distant forests provided the
sought after boon, yet both the Odyssey and the Gilgamesh
Epic center around the theme of the journey to distant unknown
regions.

Archetypes do not refer to inherited ideas, but

rather to inherited modes of psychic functioning which have
the potential to become actualized as archetypal images in
accordance with the individual’s frame of reference and with
respect to ongoing external reality.

Jung states that arch-

types are
i

. . . forms without content, representing merely the
possibilities of a certain type of perception and
action. When a situation occurs which corresponds to
a certain archetype, that archetype becomes activated.6
Because Ju n g ’s concern is primarily finding a thera
peutic methodology (though a relatively loose one) through
which a viable existence can be achieved, his concern is
initially psychology and not ontology.

Though through his

investigations he finds that ontology (though he does not
call it that) is central to his psychology, he nevertheless
writes in terms of his original goal.

He finds patterns of

behavior which are universal in man and seem to be the key to
achieving a viable existence insofar as his findings with
patients indicate these dispositions must be recognized and
appropriated.
6
P- 43*

If they are not appropriated, their force is

Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious,

such that they will make themselves manifest in degenerate
forms and seemingly unexplainable preoccupations which will
block the clear appropriation of other archetypes and mili
tate against a viable existence.

This is exampled when the

wilderness is viewed as a threat to society and culture that
must be controlled and destroyed rather than preserved as a
region which articulates a freedom and openness toward the
world and ourselves.
A cursory view of his writings would seem to indicate
their basis is an iritersubjectivity or some form of psych
ologism.

This is not the case.

While seldom explicitly

expressed, implicit throughout his writings is the 'acknowl
edgment that the world is the final objective ground.

The

collective unconscious mirrors the world and carries its
message.

Jung;

No, the collective unconscious is anything "but an
incapsulated personal system; it is sheer objectivity,
as wide as the world and open to all the world*
There
I am the object of every subject, in complete reversal
of my ordinary consciousness, where I am always the
subject that has an object. There I am utterly one
with the world, so much a part of it that I forget all
too easily who I really am.
"Lost in oneself" is a
good way ,.of describing this state.
But the self is the
world, if only a consciousness could see it. That is
why we must know who we are.7
Jung's assertion that the world is the objective ground for
the archetypes and human experiencing arises in part from
the notion of evolution.
^ I b i d . , p. 22,

Dispositions toward certain
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actions and modes of perception arise in the evolutionary
process through interaction with the world.
emerged from the world.

Life itself

Further, perception of the world is

not arbitrary and subject to any variation at will, but
rather delimited by the world itself.

One cannot walk

through walls.
What follows is a partial summary of certain aspects
of Heidegger’s existential analysis as set forth in Being and
Time.

It will provide the necessary conceptual tools for an

inquiry into archetypal regions.

In Being and Time Heidegger

distinguishes between two types of inquiry.

Ontical inquiry

is an inquiry into things and is the characteristic inquiry
of the sciences.

Ontological inquiry is concerned with

meaning and the question of Being.

8

While ontical inquiry

deals with the categorization of entities, ontological inquiry
deals with the existentials of Being as the terms of its
inquiry.

Being,is not an entity, a collection of entities,

or the1 most' general category of entities, but existence
itself.

Dasein, literally ’’being there,” is the ontological

naming of what is ontically called man.
ontical inquiry is factual.
revealed is factical.

What is revealed in

In ontological inquiry what is

What is ja£/issue in Being and Time is

the question of the meaning of Being.

However, it will be

shown that the issue of meaning is inadequately dealt with in
8
Martin Heidegger, Being and T i m e , trans. by John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, p.
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Being and Time and that something like archetypal regions are
necessary in order to adequately deal with it as an existen
tial force.

The existential analysis of Dasein is fundamen

tal insofar as it is concerned with all the ways in which
Casein can exist and therefore encompasses all other forms
of inquiry,

The existential totality constitutes the final

horizon of Dasein.
An aspect of Dasein*s faeticity is Being-in-the-world.
Dasein finds itself already in a world.
With equal primordiality Dasein also possesses— as
constitutive for its Understanding of existence— an
understanding of the Being of all entities of a
character other than its own.9

(
The world shows itself ontically in that its entities are
subject to inquiry and ontologically in that the world is
determinative‘for Dasein*s understanding of its Being.
Be for Dasein is to Be-in-the-world.

To

The primary mode in

which Dasein relates to the world is to use it.

One opens a

door, hammers something, and eats something before he thinks
of thinking about its "nature" or "objective" properties.

10

This mode of relatedness of things Heidegger calls readinessto-hand.

Describing the world in terms of things independent

of their function is thus a derivative mode and is character
istically the sole subject of scientific analysis.
% b i d . , p. 34-.
^ I b i d . , p. 9 6 .

This
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mode of relating Heidegger calls the present-at-hand.
In each case, Dasein is at issue for itself.

11
What

Dasein does and what happens to Dasein matters to Dasein.
"That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very
Being is m

each case mine."

12

And because Dasein is in each case its own possibility,
it can, in its very Being, "choose'’ itself and win
itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself;
or only "seem" to do so.13
Dasein can be authentic and inauthentic.

Authentically

eigentlich Dasein can make its possibilities its own eigen
in awareness of its own existence.

Inauthentically Dasein is

unaware of itself, or that is to say aware of itself only as
others see it.

The who of Dasein is primarily encountered as

the they.
We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man]
take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about litera
ture and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink
back from the "great mass" as they shrink back; we
find "shocking" what they find shocking. The "they,"
which is nothing definite, and which we all are, though
not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of every
dayness.
No one is responsible for the they, and yet everyone conforms
to it.
Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed.
Overnight, everything that is primoridal gets glossed
over as something that has long been known. Every
thing gained by a struggle becomes just something to
12Ibid. , p. 67.
^^Ibid. , p. 68.
U Ibid. , p. 164.
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be manipulated.
Every secret loses its force.
This
care of averageness reveals in turn an essential
tendency of Dasein which we call "leveling down"
[Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being.15
Nothing is at issue and nothing is appropriated as one's own
to face.
The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which
we distinguish from the authentic Self-— -that i s , of
the Self that has been taken hold of in its own way
[eigens ergriffenenj.16
In this state of everydayness Dasein conceals itself.
Dasein is involved in the ready-to-hand of the world
and content operating within the everyday expectations of
the day.

But Dasein is capable of experiencing anxiety

[Angst]*

Dasein may suddenly feel uncomfortable and strange

as if it did not quite belong, as if Something Were not
quite right.

It is not fear of something.

troubling Dasein.

Nothing is

But the nothing is telling.

as if it is not at home m

its world.

17

Dasein is at home in its expectations.

Dasein feels

In the they-world,
But ; if Dasein feels

no longer at home, at homeness becomes an issue and, more
over, Dasein's own Being becomes an issue.

Dasein cares

about what is meaningful, about what is at issue for itself,
about its potentiality-for-Being.

Care is the ontological

condition for Being-free for authenticity.
15Ibid., p. 165.
16Ibid., p. 167.
1^Ibid. , p. 233.
18Ibid.* p. 237.

18
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In the Heideggerian analysis, the world shows itself
in terms of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand.
Spatiality of the present-at-hand is in terms of ontic
measured space.

But Dasein, fundamentally, does not live in

measured space but rather the spatiality of the ready-tohand.

Heidegger:

The "above” is what is "on the ceiling*?; the ’’below"
is what is "on the flopr"; the "behind" is what is
"at the door"; all "wheres" are discovered and circum
spect ively interpreted as we go on our ways in every
day dealings; they are not ascertained and catalogued
by the observational measurement of space.19
The spatiality of ready-to-hand entities are not encountered
as isolated but in spatial contexts with other entities.
This "whither" which makes it possible for equipment
to belong somewhere, and which we circumspectively
keep in view ahead of us in our concemful dealings,
we call the region.20
The readiness-to-hand of an entity establishes its location
and function in terms of the totality of the ready-to-hand
in the region.

As an example Heidegger speaks of the sun

. . . whose light and warmth are in everyday use, has
its own places— sunrise, midday, sunset, midnight;
these are discovered in circumspection and treated
distinctively in terms of changes in the usability of
what the sun bestows.21
The places of the sun indicate regions of use.
The house has its sunny side and its shady side; the
way it is divided up into ’’rooms" is oriented toward
19Ibid. t p. 1 3 7 .
20Ibid., p. 136.
21Ibid.t p. 137.
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these, and so is the "arrangement" within them,
according to their character as equipment.22
Heidegger explicates region in terms of the use of
the ready-to-hand, but in his analysis of region (at least
in Being and Time) he glosses over an aspect of region which
is of fundamental ontological importance.

He does allude to

it although he treats it just as another example of the
regionality of the ready-to-hand.

Speaking still in terms

of the regions indicated by the positioning of the sun, he
says,
Churches and graves, for instance, are laid out
according to the rising and the setting of the sun—
the regions of life and death, which are determina
tive for Dasein itself with regard to its ownmost
possibilities of Being in the world.23
The regions in this example are different from those of
previous examples.

In previous examples regions were shown

to be contexts of usability for the ready-to-hand:

it is

difficult to do hard labor at midday when the sun is at its
hottest; plants that require much sunlight must be oriented
to receive maximum sunlight throughout the day; certain rooms
of the house are cooler or warmer than others due to their
exposure to the sun.

The regions of the ready-to-hand are,

so to speak, navigational; they are meaningful in terms of
keeping cooler or being a good gardener, but they are not
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
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ontologically decisive, or only indirectly so, for Dasein.
The death of a tomato plant is not decisive for Dasein.
Death is.

The regionality of the ready-to-hand is not

intrinsically meaningful to Dasein.

It is meaningful only

in the context of what is decisive for Dasein.
The orientation of churches and graves according to
the rising and the'setting of the sun is neither fully
ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand.

Dasein does not use the

orientation of churches and graves hut rather is called into
a selfsame orientation which attunes itself to the regions
of life and death— an intrinsically meaningful attunement
which is decisive for Dasein.

This region does not reveal

itself to Dasein as something td he used, hut as something
to he listened to, as somethirig .which hears a decisive
message.

Neither is this sort of region present-at-hand.

An ontic measurement of the orientation would not reveal its
significance for Dasein.

Indeed, it is very close to Dasein.

This ontologically decisive region is what Jung calls an
archetypal image.
It should he noted that in his later writings
Heidegger seldom deals with the ready-to-hand and presentat-hand, but turns instead, more towards what has here been
called archetypal regions.

The deficiencies in Being, and .

Time, however, point to the deficiencies inherent in tran
scendental philosophies as a whole.

They ultimately occlude

the very thing which would make their enterprise vital—

16
meaning.

The sources and grounding of meaning are covered

over and remain hidden in the navigational possibilities
which are explicated.

Thus in traditional transcendental

analysis the world becomes nihilated and Dasein's Self is
preempted.
The region indicated by the orientation of churches
and graves is determinative for Dasein.

The orientation is

not merely an agreed upon spatiality created by Dasein to
stand for some thing which it finds important, but rather
the orientation is a response by Dasein to a region of con
texts -which show themselves as holding importance for Dasein.
The orientation is in terms of the region circumscribed by
the rising and setting of the sun, a region which is of
ontological import for Dasein, which Dasein did not create
with the. ready-to-rhand, and which Dasein encounters in the
world and responds toward in the building of its churches
and the burying of its dead.
.•Just as the "whither" of the ready-to-hand allows for
the belonging of the ready-to-hand in such a way that it
makes possible for Dasein a circumspective and projective
involvement in regional possibilities, so too archetypal
regions are constituted such that Dasein is involved circumspectively and ahead of itself in ontologically articulate
situations.

Dasein’s world not only shows itself as equip

ment for use (ready-to-hand) and objects for analysis
(present-at-hand) but also as ontologically articulate for

Dasein.

Dasein in this way is,n o t ,only in a world, but in a

world as belonging to it.

Because the analysis of Dasein*s

comportment toward the world in Being and Time is restricted
to two m o d e s , the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand, the
importance of a comportment which is not primarily character
ized by analyzing objects or use of the world is hidden or
treated misleadingly.

The regions of intrinsic meaning, such

as death and its correlation with the sun, go unexplicated as
such.

Instead when they inevitably arise (in the analysis

of death, for example), they are fit rather uncomfortably
into the existing analytical framework.

The analysis thus

suffers in that it fails to fully ground Dasein in "lasting”
regions which are not subject to ontical or utilitarian dis
missal.

And it suffers in that the status of the world is

relegated to limiting horizons off which Dasein, so to speak,
bounces in finding its way in the world, rather than as the
source of meaning and grounding force of Dasein*s Being
which Jung's archetypal analysis shows it to be.

Jung's

analysis recognizes the archetypal regions as the grounding
force towards which Dasein must turn and the images of the
world as directive toward that end.

As a traditional

phenomenological approach shows, the world provides naviga
tional boundaries, but to think of the world merely in this
way distorts the totality of what the world holds.

Jung's

archetypal approach shows the world to have a special signi
ficance.

It directs Dasein to its regions of meaning which

allow Dasein to attune itself to '’what matters" and so fully
be itself.

What is authentically Dasein's own is articulated

in the world.

Dasein and the world are bound in a belonging

to Dasein’s Being.

That is, what is ontologically decisive

for Dasein and belongs to it as its own belongs also to the
world.
Meaning is an existential.

It is part of the facti-

city of Dasein that meaning is a fundamental aspect of its
Being.

This is revealed not only in meaningful situations

as in the regions of life and death, but also in meaningless
ness.

Meaninglessness matters to Dasein and reveals meaning

as an existential concern of Dasein.
create meaning in a meaningless world.

Dasein does not merely
Dasein is always

already in a world in which meaning is an issue.

The sepa

ration of meaning from the world occurs only in isolated
ontical analysis which excludes the ontological.

In ontical

analysis, if objects are analyzed as apart from Dasein, then
of course meaning does not appear, for meaning shows itself
only when it resonates that which is able to receive meaning—
Dasein.

In ontological analysis, there is no subject-object
'i .

schism as such and thus meaning is revealed as belonging at
the same time to the world and to Dasein.

Heidegger’s

analysis in Being and Time is accurate in that it shows that
meaning belongs at the same time to the world and to Dasein,
but it is misleading in that it deals with meaning from a
navigational standpoint and fails to disclose fully the
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intrinsic meaning of archetypal regions which ground Dasein
simultaneously in itself and the world and upon which navi
gational meaning is ultimately dependent for its status as
meaningful.
Archetypal images are not only static referents— ■
sunrise as region of birth, sunset as region of death— but
also refer to existential regions of involvement and move
ment among and through regions which tie together the existentialia of Dasein.

An aspect of the image of the sun is that

of bringing to light and making present.

In its region of

day, it brings illumination and presence to the things of
the world.

The journey of the sun across the sky connects

and relates the regions of sunrise and sunset— the regions
of birth and death— and corresponds to Dasein's journey
whose Being in its region of day is the making present of
Being.

The coming into Being of Dasein and the termination

of Dasein’s existence are tied together through its journey.
Without the archetypes, the bearers of intrinsic
meaning, navigational1events would be isolated, fragmented,
and void of meaning.

Since they are not in themselves mean

ingful, they would exist as empty events towards nothing.
But meaning is an existential, and the navigational events
are toward the intrinsically meaningful which reaches back
to embrace and unify them and to infuse them with the meaning
of the regions.

Thus, the "Da-Sein" is more than a mere

series of things and events occurring in the space between

20
the horizons of birth and death; it is authentically a
weaving of archetypes which ties together and unifies
"Da-Sein" meaningfully.
Archetypal images are often rejected, dismissed, or
ignored.

Jung deals with this issue in terms of the one

sidedness of the conscious
and the repression
of the con,
i
tents of the unconscious.

Such an approach fuiictions well

therapeutically, but in tenns of a rigorous ontology it falls
short in that it tends to focus on the consciousness of man
and in so doing does not adequately deal with the world as
the "objectivating" source of these images.

It is necessary,

therefore, to turn to Heidegger’s analysis of everydayness
and death which is more fully;capable of handling the onto
logical status of the world and Dasein's relation to it.
In everydayness, the they passes off archetypal images
as something that everyone knows anyway.

The they grants

that sunrise sometimes symbolizes birth and because the they
"understands" what sunrise means it can dismiss it as some
thing it already knows and thus close itself off from the
possibility of entering the region.

The they acknowledges

that sunset sometimes symbolizes death and in doing so takes
an "objective" view which distances itself from what is
decisive for it.
region its own.

The they protects Dasein from making the
Archetypal images may be rejected as being

meaningless to ontical analysis (of the present-at-hand)
and as irrelevant to everyday functioning (the ready-to-hand).

21
Archetypal regions may be concealed by an analysis "in favor"
of these regions if the analyst operated only from the dis
tance of analysis and fails himself to enter into the regions
of concern and make them his own.

Archetypal images may be

rejected on the grounds that their meaning is only ascribed
secondarily and only after what is at issue is revealed pre
viously by some analysis.

But Dasein does not first of all

analyze the world; rather it first inhabits it and moves

in

and through its regions.

The

analysis is dependent upon and

grounded in these regions

and

not vice versa.

Dasein is

struck with and taken into an involvement with a sunset be
fore it analyzes it.

Archetypal regions resonate and are

somehow meaningful for Dasein before it is at all clear or
articulate what is meant.

But the regions, too, seem to

lead into and call for articulation.

As the sun slips past

the horizon and the world begins to darken, Dasein may be
turned toward its own nightfall and to circumspective con
cern toward what is at issue for itself.

The they may

reject these regions, as for example when Dasein flees from
a facing of its death into the more comfortable oblivion of
everydayness, but authentically these regions involve Dasein
in articulating and making its own what it is.

The regions

may be rejected but if appropriated openly their numinosity
draws Dasein into deeper involvements with the region and
with itself.

The region of sunset calls circumspectively in-

to question the nature of the journey just completed and
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correspondingly calls into question each Dasein in the midst
of its own journey between its horizons of birth and deatho
The they appropriated the journey as that which hap
pens between birth and death.
seems a bit odd to the they.

Calling that space "journey"
The space between birth and

death is more generally called one's life.

While life may

at times be a numinous term, it is more often a passive cate
gory which describes oneself without specifically involving
oneself.

Life is the space between birth and death which

describes a status of all sentient beings and which also
therefore applies to the status of oneself.

As one's life,

the space between the horizons of birth and death is rele
gated to the they.

Heidegger speaks of the leveled down

in-between when he says:
Dasein does not fill up a track or stretch "of life"—
one which is somehow present-at-hand— with the phases
of its momentary actualities.
It stretches itself
along in such a way that its own Being is constituted
in advance as a stretching-along.24
Thus Dasein authentically is not involved isolatedly with
things and events but with the totality of the "in-between"
which is characterized in journey.

In neglecting the arche

typal regions, the they attempts to operate in terms of the
navigational.

Things and events lack coherence, meaning

disappears, and "Da-Sein" becomes the empty "in-between" of
birth and death.

A journey is not passive and empty, but

2^Ibid., p. 426.
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implies commitment.

A journey is an undertaking.

space does not readily admit' its final horizon.

Life as
In journey

there is recognition of the existential movement of the
joumeyer, Dasein, toward the region of death.

Appropriated

as journey, Dasein makes its venture its own in recognition
of itself.
Heidegger's analysis shows that death plays a decisive
role in Dasein's existence.

Not only is it decisive in that

death is, the end of Dasein's existence and therefore is hori
zontal for Dasein, but it may be decisive in that it can
function radically to alter Dasein's existence in its Beingin-the-world.

Death is appropriated by the they as that

which happens to one sometime— everybody dies.

But in making

death its own, that is, appropriating death authentically,
Dasein not only authenticates this "phase" of its own exist
ence but is turned toward the authenticity of its Being-inthe-world as a whole— it is this existential turning toward
the totality of its ownmost possibilities which makes death
a decisive factor in Dasein's existence.

Heideggers

Dasein finds itself face to face with the "nothing" of
the possible impossibility of It's existence. Anxiety
is anxious about the potentiality-for-Being of the
entity so destined [des so bestimmten Seienden], and
in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility.
Anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein, and it
allows it, in this individualization of itself, to be
come certain of the totality of its potentiality-forBeing. 25
25I b i d o , p. 3 1 0 .
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The possibility of its own non-being focuses Dasein*s concern
toward, the question of Being and it turns Dasein toward its
ownmost possibilities in which it is free to make itself] its
own.
Death thus frees Dasein for itself.

The decisive and

pervasive regional "where” for Dasein freed for itself is "on
the journey."

Dasein is always between the horizons of birth

and death; authentically appropriated, Dasein is always and
•everywhere "on the journey."

Turned toward death, Dasein is

faced with its ownmost possibilities for Being.

And moreover

it is faced with the question "Which of these possibilities
matter in the face of the final horizon?"
most , the journey matters.

First and fore

The appropriation of the journey

as one's own, turning towards one's possibilities, makes
possible an authentic asking of the question "What matters?"
And it is along this journey that what matters announces
itself.

That is, what matters "matters" in the face of

death— -the face which the journey is always and ineluctably
turned toward.
Heidegger's analysis pointedly shows that making
death one's own turns Dasein toward its ownmost possibilities
of Being and unifies "Da-Sein" by relating it to its possi
bilities.

But not all possibilities matter "in the end,"

and it is a failing of the analysis that it is not able to
deal specifically with "what matters."

Dasein can only be

fully unified, related, and meaningful when it takes up with
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its archetypal possibilities specifically.

Heidegger's

analysis lacks a concept, which would designate a movement
of appropriation that is open to all possibilities and yet
is particularly attuned and receptive to the specific arche
typal possibilities which are ontologically decisive.

The

journey, properly'understood, is such an ontological move
ment and comportment and fulfills this lack.
The end of the journey is death.

Death is the final

horizon for Dasein and makes possible the journey itself.
But if the end of the journey is death, is this also its
goal?

In one sense it is— the goal is the culmination of the

journey— thus death is journey's goal.

But while decisively

important, this goal does not belong just to the journey but
to all the possibilities of Dasein.

It is legitimate, then,

to ask what differentiates journey as an existential, that
is, to ask what is the journey's goal which it admits to in
its own involvement toward it; and similarly to inquire into
the nature of its path.

That is, what characterizes Dasein

which is on the journey, and where does Dasein go on its way
toward death?
The appropriation of the journey as one's own which
makes possible an authentic asking of the question "What
matters?" involves a capability of Dasein which is called
understanding.

The viability of the question "What matters?"

is dependent upon the possibility of an articulate compre
hension of what is at issue and a concernful openness to

that which speaks to "what matters."

The constitution of

understanding is thus significant to Dasein, who is on the
journey.

Heidegger provides the basis for the analysis?

If the term "understanding" is taken in a way which
is primordially existential, it means to be projecting
towards a potentially-for-Being for the saEe of which""
any Pas'eTn exists.
"
Heidegger explicates the inauthentic and authentic
modes of understanding with respect to the three ecstases
of time;

past, present, and future.

In the authentic’future

characterized by anticipation, Dasein moves toward its Self
in terms of coming to meet its ownmost possibilities.
Inauthentically future is characterized by expecting in
which Dasein waits for possibilities in terms of the daily
activity with which it is concerned in everydayness.

Of the

authentic present characterized by the "moment of vision,"
Heidegger says it "permits us _to encounter for the first
time what can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or presentat-hand."
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The inauthentic present is characterized by

"making present" in which Dasein is merely involved in its
everyday activities.

The authentic past is characterized by

repetition in which Dasein makes its own what it already is
and is toward its potentiality-for-Being in the context of
what it already has been.

Inauthentically past is a for

getting, a backing away in the face of what Dasein
2^Ibid. , p. 385.
2^Ibid., p. 388.
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existentially has been.
Throughout the analysis, what characterizes the
inauthentic is an anonymous or vicarious involvement in the
everyday activities with the ready-to-hand and the presentat-hand.

Authenticity is characterized by a resoluteness

and a making one’s own the possibilities of ready-to-hand
and present-at-hand involvements.

His characterization of

the authentic present examples this point when he says of
the "moment of vision" that it "permits us to encounter for
the first time what can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or
present-at-hand."
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Authenticity permits an encountering.

But the force

of the encountering permitted by authentic appropriation is
not sufficiently characterized by navigational possibilities
of the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand which Dasein
makes it own, rather the existential force is the encounter
with that which shows itself to Dasein as being intrinsi
cally meaningful— archetypal regions.

The archetypal regions

are the final horizons of the "for the sake of which" towards
which Dasein has its Being.

The navigational is meaningful

secondarily and in terms of that toward which Dasein exists.
Archetypal regions may be concealed in everydayness as being
irrelevant to the "important" tasks of the ready-to-hand or
the findings of the present-at-hand; but Heidegger has
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himself shown that their decisiveness for Dasein is not
obviated.

The archetypal region, of death bears this out.

Heideggers
Even in average everydayness, this ownmost potentialityTor^Being, which is non-relational and not to be out
stripped , is constantly an issue for Dasein. This is
tHe case wHen its concern i s .merely in the mode of an
untroubTed indifference towards the uttermost possi
bility of existence.29
In this inauthentic appropriation of death which does
not make death fully Dasein’s own, Dasein turns away from
itself in the face of its Self.

When Dasein*s non-Being is

revealed as its own and not to be outstripped, its Being is
made forcefully and urgently meaningful.

So, most impor

tantly, beyond the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand the
authentic present permits an encounter with the archetypal
image which speaks decisively for Dasein.

This is "moment

of vision" in the fullest and most proper sense in which
Dasein moves toward seeing its Self.
Authenticity, then, is not characterized merely by a
resoluteness and a making one's own the possibilities of
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand involvements as Heidegger's
analysis asserts, but most importantly it is the awareness
and the making one’s own archetypal possibilities encountered
"on the journey"— regions of meaning which constitute the
final horizons of the "for the sake of which" and which
admit to no higher functional end— thereby residing in
29Ibid., p. 299.
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themselves as encountered allowing Dasein to Be in these
regions nearest to itself constituting its authentic Self.
Heidegger's analysis of authenticity in Being and
Time is misleading and deficient.

The final for-which and

towards-which of Dasein is constituted in the archetypal
regions— the intrinsically meaningful and final ground of
Dasein*s Being.

Heidegger's analysis of death (for example)

shows dramatically and decisively the importance of arche
typal regions, yet his basic framework of the ready-to-hand
and present-at-hand is incapable of handling the. region of
death as well as other archetypal regions.

Death is quali

tatively different from other ready-to-hand possibilities
such as using doorknobs to open doors.

It is different

because it is not merely navigational but intrinsically,
meaningful and decisive for Dasein's Self.

Authenticity,

then, should rightfully and in the end fundamentally involve
the recognition of the intrinsically meaningful archetypal
regions as the decisive force for Dasein; the making one's
own of these regions and the recognition of the ready-tohand and present-at-hand as Being toward and for the arche
typal regions which ground them and grant them validity.
This analysis differs from Heidegger's in that it makes a
third distinction in Dasein's comportment toward the world
which could perhaps be called journeying— the ontological
movement and comportment toward regions of archetypal sig
nificance.

And it recognizes the authenticity of all
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ready-to-hand and present-at-hand involvements as dependent
upon arohetypal regions.

Dasein does not comport itself

authentically merely by throwing itself into navigational
possibilities as Heidegger seems to suggest, but can only
comport itself authentically when it attends to archetypal
possibilities which are intrinsically meaningful and ontologically determinative.
While understanding is involved in all three ecstases
of time, it is primarily related to the future.

Under

standing projects Dasein into its possibilities as coming
toward its Self.

Heideggers

Projection is basically futural; it does not primarily
grasp the projected possibility thematically just by
having it in view, but it throws itself into’it as a
possibility.30
As "on the journey" Dasein is projected futurally ahead of
itself toward regions of meaning which speak to "what
matters."

Dasein understands itself in terms of archetypal

regions in which it is not yet but in which it in some sense
dwells in anticipation of becoming its Self.

Authentically,

then, Dasein understands itself as open to archetypal regions
which lie ahead of itself on the way toward death which as
journey is always open, projected, and never fully resolved.
What follows is a brief and partial summary of The
Epic of Gilgamesh, a four-thousand-year-old Sumerian tale of
the journey of Gilgamesh, King of Uruk.

^Ibid. , p. 386.

The tale will provide

a basis for further inquiry into journey and into regions of
archetypal images.

As the tale begins, Gilgamesh is a youth

ful, strong king unsurpassed and unbeaten in war and in love.
But his energies are wearing out his subjects and devastating
the kingdom.

In answer to their appeal, the gods send the

people Enkidu, a "natural man," untamed and the equal of
Gilgamesh.

Out of their confrontation a deep and insepar

able friendship ensues in which each is the other's half.
Together they do battle and bring back treasures for the good
of the kingdom.

But in slaying the Bull of Heaven they anger

the gQds and one of them must die.
is deeply grieved.

It is Enkidu.

Gilgamesh

He no longer feels the unconquerable

warrior, but is stultified and defeated.

He is a mortal

like all men.
Gilgamesh undertakes a long and fearful journey into
the .wilderness, seeking the secret of immortality.

At the

mountain of the sun at whose twin peaks are both sunrise and
sunset he confronts and overcomes the monster guardians who
are part man, part dragon.

Gilgamesh walks through the moun

tain of the sun twelve leagues into the absolute darkness
retracing the journey of the sun and emerging into the garden
of the sun which is on this side of the waters of death.

The

sun sees Gilgamesh and hearing of his quest warns him that
he will fail.

Prom the wine goddess, Siduri, a daughter of

the sun, he receives instructions for crossing the waters of
death.

After crossing he is put to a test.

He must remain
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awake if he is to have everlasting life, but in the end he
cannot keep from sleep.

He is told of the plant of Youth

Regained which with great difficulty he is able to pluck
from the bottom of the sea.

But immortality again slips his

grasp as a snake consumes the plant.

Gilgamesh accepts his

destiny and returns home.
He was wise, he saw mysteries and knew secret things,
he brought us a tale of the days before the flood. He
went a long journey, was weary, worn out with labour,
and returning engraved on a stone the whole story.31
With the death of Enkidu, Gilgamesh*s grief turns him
toward the issue of his own death.
Gilgamesh traveled over the wilderness, he wandered over
the grasslands, a long journey, in search of Utnapishtim, whom the gods took after the deluge; and they set
him:to live in the land of Dilmun, in the garden of the
sun; and to him alone of men they gave everlasting
life.32
The region of the sun, the region of life and death, calls
Gilgamesh to undertake the journey.

It is not merely one

among many equal possibilities of ready-to-hand and presentat-hand involvements which present themselves to a Dasein who
makes ithem its own, rather it is the compelling possibility
which calls Dasein.

A traditional phenomenology of naviga

tional possibilities could only explicate those possibili
ties but. it could not specify the one possibility that
mattered.
.

Thus traditional phenomenology is ultimately

-ji
J N; K. Sandars, trans., The Epic of Gilgamesh, p. 114.

^2Ibid., p.

94.
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ontologically silent.

An archetypal approach does not level

down Being by showing a multitude of possibilities as
equally valid, but functions on behalf of Being to reveal
the meaningful.

Heidegger's treatment of death suggests that

he is aware of possibilities which are intrinsically meaning
ful, specific, and ineluctably binding; but his analysis in
Being and Time is hampered by its attachment to the tradi
tional phenomenological approach which empties the possibili
ties of intrinsic meaning.
cally directive.

Archetypal regions are ontologi

They are not equally arbitrary possibili

ties and thus voided of intrinsic meaning as are the readyto-hand and present-at-hand, rather they are articulate and
specific.

They direct Dasein toward its Self by indicating

existential movements of attunement which accord Dasein with
the world and its Self.
Initially it can be said that myth (exampled by the
Gilgamesh Epic) functions as the metaphor of Being.

The

regions of the sun are metaphors for the regions of birth and
death.

But it is not metaphor in the sense of a contrived

sign which is unimportant in itself and only functions to
refer to the "real" object.
shows itself.
tance.

Myth is a way in,which Being

Thus myth is of fundamental ontological impor

If Dasein functions wholly within myth, however, it

operates unconsciously and thus inauthentically.

That i s ,

if Dasein is absorbed wholly in myth— in the world so to
say— it obliterates itself and flees from a facing of itself.
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Operating along with an ontological analysis, however, myth
is a force for Dasein’s authenticity.

An ontological

analytic provides a critical framework for the circumspective
concern and existential awareness necessary for authenticity.
But it must also he kept in mind that myth reveals the
intrinsically meaningful regions which an ontological analy
sis is toward.

An ontological analytic must therefore

finally turn to myth to show it its way.
Traditional archetypal theory has recognized the
force and decisiveness of myth, hut in dealing with it in
terms of a therapeutic methodology it has used it first of
all "because it works" and pnly secondarily does it attend
critically to the "ontological grounding" of myth.

What

traditional archetypal theory has done is to provide an open
ing to myth and to the regions of intrinsic meaning, hut it
tends to deal with them more as mental forces and in so doing
covers over the world.

As a rigorous arid analytical force

it is the task of ontological inquiry to pursue the problem
where traditional archetypal theory leaves off or falls
short.

Yet it must be remembered that archetypal theory,

phenomenology, and existential ontology are themselves in a
sense myths "in their own time" and as such are subject to
further circumspective .and thematic inquiry by future myths.
New myth must study old myth to see where it is going and in
this way finds and is its destiny.

Taken in this extended

sense, myth is the ontological force— and the face of Being.,
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This analysis must turn again to the Gilgamesh Epic
for further clues to its direction,,

Gilgamesh says to

Siduri, "How can I be silent, how can I rest, when Enkidu
whom I love is dust, and I too shall die and be laid in the
earth forever."33

Turned toward death, the journey is the

compelling possibility for Dasein.
is compromised*

The comfort of the they

No longer at home, Dasein cannot rest.

Yet the journey is forbidding.

At the entrance to the moun

tain of the sun, Gilgamesh is advised, "no mortal man has
gone into the mountain; the length of it is twelve leagues
of darkness; in it there is no light, but the heart is
•54

oppressed with darkness."-^

Unsupported by the comforting

parameters and expectations of everydayness, the journey
leads Dasein into difficult and uncertain regions which
threaten to dissolve Dasein's resoluteness and throw it again
into an inauthentic comportment which shields it from these
difficulties.

Gilgamesh.replies to the advice, "Although I

should go in sorrow and in pain, with sighing and with weep-

ing, still I must go.

35 .

Open the gate of the mountain."-^

Firm in resoluteness, the entry is granted and engagement
begins.
Emerging from the immense darkness, Gilgamesh enters
33Ibid. , p. 99«
3^Ibid. , p.

95

0

3^Ibid. , p. 96.
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the glorious garden of the sun.

In this region he is warned

by Shamash, the sun, that he will never find the life for
which he is searching.

Gilgamesh has turned toward the ques

tion of death as fundamental to his Being but is unable to
accept it as fundamentally his own.

He replies to Shamash,

Now that I have toiled and strayed so far over the
wilderness, am I to sleep, and let the earth.cover my
head for ever? Let my eyes see the sun until they are
dazzled with looking. Although I am no better than a
dead man, still let me see the light of the s u n . 36
Gilgamesh crosses the ocean which borders the garden of the
sun and ventures still farther into the wilderness in search
of everlasting life.
The "where does Dasein go" on the journey toward
death is wilderness.

It is venture into unknown regions.

Into the wilderness the they does not venture and the way is
not worn with the paths of everydayness.

Dasein "on the

journey" understands itself as coming toward its Self; but
the Self it is coming towards is not yet..

Inauthentically,

Dasein waits for ready-to-hand possibilities which it knows
and which do not pertain to becoming its Self.

Because it

knows what approaches and comports itself in waiting only
because it knows, it closes off possibilities which it does
not know— possibilities which would function to effect its
Self.
Authentically, Dasein anticipates possibilities of
36Ibid., p. 97.
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intrinsic meaning which move it toward its Self.

But what

its Self is it does not fully know, and, because under
standing is projected ahead of itself, its Self is never
fully resolved.

Thus, in anticipating Dasein becomes reso

lute in openness.

The journey is not to a goal which is

the journey's resolve.

Authentically, the journey is appro

priated as openness to what lies ahead on its way and an
endlessness which though touching many regions does not take
Dasein to a point of debarkation.

As long as Dasein exists,

that is to say as long as it is Dasein, it is "on the
journey."

Within the journey’s horizon of death, therefore,

the journey is endless.
way.towards death.

The journey is an endlessness on its

The journey, an endless openness admit

ting to no resolution, takes Dasein into the wilderness.
The wilderness is the region of the open.
turns away and recoils at the wilderness.

The they

For the they it

is a lawless "no m a n ’s land" (the no man which is everyone
but no one— Heidegger's "they").

But it is a lawless "no

m a n ’s land" only in the sense of. the laws of everydayness;
it is Dasein's land.

The they recoils from regions in which

everydayness is not extended, and it is not extended in the
"lawless" wilderness.
faces.

The land of the wilderness has two

It is the dark abyss where powerful forces threaten

to destroy Dasein unprotected by the structures of everyday
ness.

Gilgamesh is threatened by the half-man, half

scorpion monsters.

Nihilism threatens Dasein unprotected by
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the rules and laws and obligations of the everyday.
The they not only recoils from wilderness, hut,
seeing that it is d force which rejects its rules and obligations, seeks to obliterate it.
gives it the power it needs.

Increasingly, technology

That is why the they must build

roads through and log every stretch of forest.

Technology

gives it the power to extend itself into the wilderness, to
have a productive forest, and thus save itself from the free
dom to be authentic which threatens it.

Threatened as it is,

the they cannot rest until it has made every stretch of
wilderness everyone’s own— no one's own.
The other face of wilderness shows itself as the land
of hidden treasures, sacred boon, and authentic possibili
ties.

For Gilgamesh it holds the secrets of the gods.

Dasein it holds the Self.

For

The Self it holds is not the self

apart from the world as merely in i t , rather the self it
holds is the Dasein who has entered into its regions and
participated in its images.

Dasein finds that what gives it

its meaning and makes it its Self is found in the regions— ■
in the world.

The world in sharing gives as possible the

Self for Dasein to make its own.

The Being of Dasein and

the Being of the world coincide and are shared as selfsame
in the archetypal regions.

The regions of life, death, and

journey; and the regions and path of the sun accord in show
ing Dasein what its Self is.
The they realizes that the wilderness over which it
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now has technological power has its treasures.

In fleeing

from itself the they must avoid its autochthony and so it
needs the wilderness for its flight.

The wilderness is seen

as holding treasures and thus gives it the excuse to flee
from itself. , It must technologically dominate and destroy
the wilderness which denies its "laws" and yet it must pre
serve the wilderness so that it can flee from itself.
the end it attempts both and achieves neither.

In

Recreation

sites and trailer parks are instituted so that everybody may
share in the recreational boon.

Campsites are positioned

for maximum utilization, and paths are cut and well marked
so that nobody will go astray.

Nothing is at issue in

recreational facilities, and so the they makes itself safe
from its Self by successfully preempting any possibility of
involvement in wilderness.

But neither can it fully flee

itself for the parameters of the everyday are extended, and
"not-at-homeness" remains to confront Dasein.
The archetypal image of wilderness accurately shows
Dasein the "whither" of its journey.

A navigational analysis

is oblivious to the message of the wilderness.

Wilderness

is the region in which intrinsic meaning i6 radically and
forcefully, at issue.

In wilderness Dasein’s very Being is

at stake and it is compelled to turn toward that which
grounds it.

If the.journey is toward the Self, the question

of the existential "setting" of "beginning to achieve the
Self" arises; that is in what existential context does Dasein
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begin to meet and be its Self?

The encounter and engagement

of archetypal regions constitutes part of the. "setting” as
the ground of the Self.

Heidegger's analysis of histori-

cality and destiny provide further clues.
How is Dasein to understand itself as it enters into
\
archetypal regions?

What has it meant to other Daseins who

have entered these regions and how have they comported them
selves in meeting this force of their Being?

Such questions

are part of the historizing (and historicality— the onto
logical counterpart to the historical) of Dasein.

The taking

over in resoluteness current possibilities of authentic
existing disclosed by the historicality in which Dasein finds
itself thrown is what Heidegger calls heritage.

In this

authentic coming back to one’s throwness as its own, "Dasein
, hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility
■37

which it has inherited and yet c h o s e n . W h a t

Heidegger

calls fate is the awareness and the making, one's own the
finite Being that he is.

In light of Dasein's finitude and

consequently the limited nature of its possibilities,
Dasein's possibilities gather significance and meaning
achieves urgency and numinosity.
exists as Being-with-Others.

But Dasein as fateful

The Others also historize and

this co-historizing Heidegger calls destiny.
Heidegger:
37

J Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 435.
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Destiny is not something that puts itself together
out of individual fates, any more than Being-withone-another can he, conceived as the occurring to
gether of several Subjects. Our fates have already
been guided in advance, in our Being with one another
in the same world and in our resoluteness for defi
nite possibilities.38
Destiny does not a,rise from the fates of Dasein coming to
gether to form a sort of collective fate, rather destiny
arises in advance of individual fates in Dasein's Being in
the same world resolute for definite possibilities.

Dasein

participates in that destiny and in the moment of vision
makes it its own for "its time."
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In Dasein's day, its

journey between sunrise and sunset, Dasein in an authentic
comporting of itself attunes itself to its destiny which
discloses regions of engagement to be in its own time.

"In

its own time" and "for its time" mean that what has been as
specific situational involvements in time and which this
Dasein has never been cannot be made its own, but what has
been, Dasein is, in the sense of its destiny to be its Self
for its time.

What has been discloses regions of its des

tiny which it may enter in its own specific situational
involvements in its own time in its journey between its
terminal horizons as Dasein.

Heidegger:

Only in communicating and struggling does the power
of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in
and with its "generation" goes to make up the full
-^Ibid. , p. 436.
-^Ibid. , p. 437.
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authentic historizing.of Dasein.
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The entering into destiny in one's own time is
achieved in the archetypal image.

Without entering into

archetypal regions, Dasein cannot fully he destined.

In

that navigational events are in themselves empty of meaning,
there could be no reaching by Dasein into the past and into
the future in a gathering of itself to its Self which
embraces understandingly its Being.

Heidegger says of des

tiny, "Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our
Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities."
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But Dasein can only be

fully resolute when it is resolute for something which
grounds and gives reason for its resoluteness— the arche
typal regions.
resoluteness.

Grounding is an ontological precondition for
Heidegger's failure to distinguish between

navigational and archetypal factors leads to the misleading
conclusion that Dasein can be fully resolute and thus fully
be destined for something that is in itself empty and
ungrounded.
cance.

Destiny discloses regions of archetypal signifiL

Dasein enters the regions as, they are disclosed in

its own time and participates in and further finds its des
tiny.

Destiny further discloses destiny and does so for

Dasein's Self in its own time.

^ I b i d . > P*

41 Ibid.

436.

Destiny ties together and
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unifies understandingly, meaningfully, the ecstases of time.
The past as destiny gives meaningful context to what is
engaged in the present as Being the destiny in one’s own
time and is toward the future as regions of possible involve
ment which are destined for Dasein in being toward its Self.
Myth shows how archetypal regions operate toward and
in concert with destiny.

Dasein in Being toward its Self

undertakes the journey into the wilderness in search of des
tiny.

Gilgamesh ventured into the wilderness * into the

garden of the sun, in search of everlasting life.

But this

is not the lot of man and so as Shamash had warned him his
efforts are doomed to failure.

He returns to Uruk empty

handed— -and mortal.
But in failing to achieve immortality, he succeeds
in entering into his destiny.

He does not merely strive in

vain only to be beaten back into a state which he should
have realized beforehand.

Rather he has journeyed deeply

into the wilderness and entered the regions of his destiny.
His ’'failure" has enabled him to make his destiny his own,
not superficially and from afar, but emphatically in its
nearness.

Thus, the journey itself acts on behalf of des

tiny and leads Dasein to its Self— its destiny not wholly
dependent upon the path or goal set forth beforehand by a
less authentic Dasein on the way toward its Self.
Destiny permeates present-at-hand and ready-to-hand
involvements, yet the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand
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do not constitute destinies nor even possibilities for a
destiny "in one’s own time" except in,a trivial or dependent
sense.

The journey is a ready-to-hand possibility but it

can be toward destiny only because it is more than merely
ready-to-hand.

The journey is an image which bears the

meaning of destiny and infuses the navigational factors—
the ready-to-hand involvements of the journey— with a sig
nificance which Dasein is able to enter understandingly and
with a level of decisiveness made possible by the depth of
what is at stake— the way in which Dasein is to be in the
world.
On the journey, Gilgamesh is asked by Urshanabi,
Why are your cheeks so starved and your face drawn?
Why is despair in your heart and your face like the
face of one who has made a long journey; yes, why is
your face burned with heat and cold, and why do you
come wandering over the pastures in search of the
wind?42
The climax of the question, Gilgamesh's wandering in search
of the wind, is two-edged.

One edge penetrates the folly.

Gilgamesh has made a long journey in search of everlasting
life, a destiny that is not his and cannot be.
taken a tortuous journey for nothing.
as searching for wind.
it ceases to be wind.

His quest is as foolish

When wind is grasped and contained,
It does not fall into the ready-to-

hand or hold itself for the present-at-hand.
toward the other edge.
42

He has under

And this points

The plant of youth must inevitably

Sandars, trans. , The Epic of' Gilgamesh, p. 100.
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slip the grasp of Gilgamesh.

It is not everlasting life

which authentically calls him; it is the destiny of the
region, the destiny which so to speak blows through the
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand of the region and infuses
it with meaning.

By entering the archetypal regions,

Gilgamesh so to say breathes his destiny.

As authentic he

is embraced by destiny in his time and breathes the breath
of destiny— the: infusing wind of the regions, his ontologi
cal sustenance.
The journey is one of homecoming.
in two aspects.

It is homecoming

Heidegger provides the basis for the

analysis:
This character of Being-in was then brought to view
more concretely in the everyday publicness of the
"they,” which brings tranquillized self-assurance—
"Being-at-home," with all its obviousness— into the
average everydayness of Dasein. On the other hand,
as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it. back from its
absorption in the "world." Everyday familiarity col
lapses. Dasein has been individualized, but indivi
dualized as Being-in-the-world.
Being-in enters
into the existential "mode" of the "not-at-home."43
In the everydayness of the they, Dasein functions
inauthentically as separated from its destiny.
at-home."

It is "not-

Through anxiety and being turned towards death,

Dasein recognizes it as "not-at-home."

In everydayness dis

persed into the they, Dasein thinks itself at home.

But it

is only in the recognition of "not-Being-at-home" that
Dasein is able to come home, is able to turn toward its Self
^Heidegger, Being and T i m e , p. 233.
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and undertake the journey of homecoming which leads it into
the regions of its destiny, where Dasein can Be what its
Self is, residing in what grounds, shelters, and sustains
it— its ontological, thus authentic, home.
The. second aspect of homecoming is the "telling of
the story."

Heidegger:

Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our
Being with one another in the same world and in our
resoluteness for definite possibilities.
Only in com
municating and in struggling does the power of destiny
become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its
"generation" goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.44
In the "telling of the story," the power of destiny becomes
free and Dasein is able to have fully a destiny for its
time.

Part of Dasein's destiny is to have it with others.

The Gilgamesh Epic tells us that Gilgamesh "was wise, he saw
mysteries and saw secret things, he brought us a tale of the
days before the flood.

He went a long journey, was weary,

worn out with labour, and returning engraved on a stone the
whole story."
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At this point it may be helpful to turn briefly to a
later writing of Heidegger's which illustrates the continuity
of archetypal themes which make possible a destiny in one's
own time.

The essay "Remembrance of the Poet" concerns it

self with Holderlin's poem "Homecoming."

Heidegger comments:

^ I b i d . , p. 436.
45

Sandars, trans., The Epic of Gilgamesh, p. 114.
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Homecoming is the return into the proximity of the
source.
But such a return is only possible for one
who has previously, and perhaps for a long time now,
borne on his shoulders as the wanderer the burden of
the voyage, and has gone over into the source, so
that he could there experience what the nature of the
Sought-For might be, and then be able to come back
more experienced as the S e e k e r . 46
The Seeker is the one who has heard the call of the source
and has undertaken the journey which grants him entry in the
regions of what is most near.

Heidegger attends to the

•s

second aspect of homecoming when h e .says "The elegy ’Homecoming' is not a poem about homecoming; rather the elegy
itself, taken as the very poetry of which it is comprised,
is the actual homecoming."47

The bearing of the message to

those of his homeland in a sharing of destiny fulfills the
destiny of the Seeker.

Heidegger further relates "The ’not'

is the mysterious call 'to' the others in the fatherland, to
become hearers, in order that for the first time they should
learn to know the essence of the homeland."

4.8

This commen

tary applies also to the lines of the Gilgamesh Epic which
are in lament of his death:

"As in the dark month, the month

of shadows, so without him there is no light.
this was the meaning of your dream."
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0 Gilgamesh,

The Seeker in the

^ M a r t i n Heidegger, Remembrance of the P o e t , trans. by
Douglas Scott, in Existence and Being, pp. 258-259.
47Ibid. , p. 261.
4^Ibid., pp. 266-267.
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Sandars, trans., The Epic of Gilgamesh, p. 115*

region of his day brings light to the people of the homeland
such that they may learn to know the essence of their dwell
ing.

Authentically, Dasein has its Being towards archetypal

regions of the world which show it its Self and make it fully
destined for its time.

Without (that is outside of a dwell

ing in) archetypal regions, Dasein is groundless and,selfannihilating having its fragmented ’'Da-Sein” in the space
between its horizons of birth and death..

CHAPTER III

SUMMARY
This paper has attempted to show the inadequacy of
an ontological approach which merely explicates naviga
tional possibilities and the necessity of turning toward
something like an archetypal approach which is cognizant
of ontological regions of intrinsic meaning which are
specific, articulate, and directive forces functioning to
ground Dasein in its Self.

Heidegger's approach in Being

and Time is largely navigational and yet its most important
aspects point dramatically to something beyond a merely
navigational approach— a pointing which Heidegger heeds in
his later writings.

The images of myth, art, and the

"world itself" indicate the regions of issue.

Jung has

dealt systematically with these regions in terms of a thera
peutic methodology and in doing so has laid much of the
groundwork for dealing with them.

What is needed is a

broader, less limited inquiry which is not bound only to
"therapy."

The task of this paper has been threefold!

to

show the importance of archetypal inquiry for the philo
sophic tradition, to precision the area of that inquiry in
terms of an existential analytic and simultaneously clarify
the direction of the existential analytic itself, and to
49
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initiate an inquiry into archetypal regions which would be
broader than a merely therapeutic approach.
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